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Analysis of the alternative equilibrium 원문보기

  • 저자

    Kim, Ja Kwang

  • 학위수여기관

    고려대학교 대학원

  • 학위구분

    국내석사

  • 학과

    경제학과

  • 지도교수

    유승한

  • 발행년도

    2014

  • 총페이지

    24 p

  • 키워드

    Revolving doors Signaling games Repeated games;

  • 언어

    eng

  • 원문 URL

    http://www.riss.kr/link?id=T13541270&outLink=K  

  • 초록

    Lobbying industry is the intersection of the political and economical systems. It is the most important part of economical system and the revolving door lobbyists play a central role in lobbying industry. This paper tries to explain the revolving door phenomenon by using signaling game in the infinite horizon. We show that there exists an collusion-maximizing equilibrium between a sequence of “qualified” regulators such that they regulates a hiring-firm leniently and a non-hiring firm stringently for the signaling their qualification. Also, comparative analysis shows that in some cases cooling-off” period can be a solution to the revolving door phenomenon.


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