Analysis of Revenue-Sharing Contracts for Service Facilities
There are customer services jointly provided by two facilities so that each customer will complete the course made up of both facilities' sub-services. The two facilities are assumed invested respectively by an infrastructure owner and one subordinate facility owner, whose partnership is built on their capital investments. This paper presents a mathematical model of Stackelberg competition between the two facility owners to derive their optimal Nash equilibrium. In this study, each facility owner's profit is consisted of fixed revenue fractions of sold services, operating costs (including depreciation cost) and maintenance costs of her facility. The maintenance costs of one facility are incurred both by failures and deterioration due to usage. Moreover, for both facilities, failures are rectified immediately by minimal repairs and preventive maintenance is carried out at a fixed time epoch. Additional assumptions are also employed to develop the model such as customer arrivals are manipulated to follow a Poisson process, and each facility's lifetime is independently Weibull-distributed. The Stackelberg game proceeds as follows. At the first stage of decision making process, the infrastructure owner (acting as a leader) decides the allocation of revenue shares based on her self-interest. After observing the allocation of revenue shares, the subordinate facility owner determines her own optimal price of services. This paper investigates actions and reactions of the two partners in the system. Then analytical conditions are proposed to achieve a unique optimal Nash equilibrium. Finally, some suggestions for further research are discussed.
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