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Journal of comparative economics 15건

  1. [해외논문]   2017-18 ACE Membership Form   SSCI


    Journal of comparative economics v.45 no.4 ,pp. II - II , 2017 , 0147-5967 ,

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    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

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  2. [해외논문]   Montias prize announcement 2016   SSCI


    Journal of comparative economics v.45 no.4 ,pp. I - I , 2017 , 0147-5967 ,

    초록

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    무료다운로드 유료다운로드

    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

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  3. [해외논문]   Machiavellian experimentation   SSCI

    Xie, Yinxi (Department of Economics, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, 1022 International Affairs Building, New York, NY 10027, USA ) , Xie, Yang (Corresponding author.)
    Journal of comparative economics v.45 no.4 ,pp. 685 - 711 , 2017 , 0147-5967 ,

    초록

    Abstract This paper proposes the following mechanism whereby polarization of beliefs could eliminate political gridlock instead of intensifying disagreement: the expectation of political payoffs from being proven correct by a policy failure could drive decision makers who do not believe in the new policy to agree to policy experimentation, because they are confident that the experiment will fail, thus increasing their political power. We formalize this mechanism in a collective decision making model in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs in which any decision other than the default option requires unanimity. We show that this consideration of political payoffs can eliminate the inefficiency caused by a unanimous consent requirement when beliefs are polarized, but could also create under-experimentation when two actors hold beliefs that differ only slightly from one another. We further show that this under-experimentation can be reduced when the political payoffs become endogenous. We illustrate the empirical relevance of the mechanism in two examples with historical narratives: we focus on the decision making process of the Chinese leadership during the country’s transition starting in the late 1970s, and we further apply the model to the disagreement within the leadership of the Allied Forces on the Western Front of World War II in the autumn of 1944. Highlights We propose a novel mechanism whereby polarization of beliefs could eliminate political gridlock instead of intensifying disagreement. We formalize the mechanism by building a collective decision making model in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs with a unanimity decision rule. The expectation of political payoffs from being proven correct could drive decision makers who do not believe in a new policy to agree on policy experimentation. Welfare implications of the political payoffs depend on the pattern of decision makers’ beliefs and whether the political payoffs are endogenous or exogenous. We provide the empirical relevance and practical feasibility of the mechanism using historical narratives about the strategy choice of the Chinese transition from the planned economy and the Allied Forces’ decision to implement Operation Market–Garden.

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    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

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  4. [해외논문]   Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies   SSCI

    Potrafke, Niklas
    Journal of comparative economics v.45 no.4 ,pp. 712 - 750 , 2017 , 0147-5967 ,

    초록

    Abstract This paper describes the empirical evidence on partisan politics in OECD panel studies. I elaborate on the research designs, the measurement of government ideology and why the empirical studies did not derive causal effects. Discussing about 100 panel data studies, the results indicate that leftwing and rightwing governments pursued different economic policies until the 1990s: the size and scope of government was larger when leftwing governments were in power. Partisan politics have not disappeared since the 1990s, but have certainly become less pronounced. In particular, government ideology still seems to influence policies such as privatization and market deregulation. I discuss the consequences of declining electoral cohesion and what future research needs to explore. Highlights Survey on partisan politics for more than 100 OECD panel studies. More than 100 panel data studies. Elaborating on the research designs, the measurement of government ideology, and identification. Leftwing and rightwing governments pursued different economic policies until the 1990s. The size and scope of government was larger when leftwing governments were in power. Partisan politics have not disappeared since the 1990s, but have certainly become less pronounced.

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    무료다운로드 유료다운로드

    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

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  5. [해외논문]   Does dividend tax impede competition for corporate charters?   SSCI

    Lai, Tat-kei (IÉSEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS 9221), France ) , Ng, Travis (Corresponding author.)
    Journal of comparative economics v.45 no.4 ,pp. 751 - 772 , 2017 , 0147-5967 ,

    초록

    Abstract We develop a model of jurisdictional competition for corporate charters among the states in which a firm’s agency cost depends on the federal dividend income tax rate and the takeover regulations of its domicile state. When firms are mobile across states, the federal dividend income tax rate affects both the intensity of competition among the states and the equilibrium level of state takeover regulations. Our model shows that increasing dividend tax rate weakens the competition for corporate charters under a condition: dividend-paying and the market for corporate control are complementary corporate governance mechanisms. This condition holds empirically, suggesting that dividend tax not only discourages firms from paying dividends but also weakens their corporate governance by disincentivizing states to improve their corporate laws. Highlights Develop a model of jurisdictional competition for corporate charters among the states. A corporation’s agency cost depends on federal dividend income tax and the takeover regulations of its domicile state. Federal dividend income tax affects the states' intensity of competition and equilibrium level of takeover regulations. Dividend tax weakens charters competition when dividend-paying and the market for corporate control are complementary. Dividend tax weakens firms' corporate governance by disincentivizing states to improve their corporate laws.

    원문보기

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    무료다운로드 유료다운로드

    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

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  6. [해외논문]   Vote buying and campaign promises   SSCI

    Keefer, Philip (Corresponding author. ) , Vlaicu, Razvan (Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank, 1300 New York Ave NW, Washington, DC 20577, USA)
    Journal of comparative economics v.45 no.4 ,pp. 773 - 792 , 2017 , 0147-5967 ,

    초록

    Abstract What explains the wide variation across countries in the use of vote buying and policy promises during election campaigns? We address this question, and account for a number of stylized facts and apparent anomalies regarding vote buying, using a model in which parties cannot fully commit to campaign promises. We find that high vote buying is associated with frequent reneging on campaign promises, strong electoral competition, and high policy rents. Frequent reneging and low party competence reduce campaign promises. If vote buying can be financed out of public resources, incumbents buy more votes and enjoy an electoral advantage, but they also promise more public goods. Vote buying has distributional consequences: voters targeted with vote buying pre-election may receive no government benefits post-election. The results point to obstacles to the democratic transition from clientelist to programmatic forms of electoral competition: parties may not benefit electorally from institutions that increase commitment. Highlights Model of electoral competition where parties can use vote buying and policy promises that they may not keep. High vote buying is associated with frequent reneging on promises, strong electoral competition, and high policy rents. Frequent reneging and low party competence reduce campaign promises; vote buying has distributional consequences. Results are robust to endogenous rents, incumbent advantage and intertemporal effects. The results account for the difficulty of transitioning from clientelist to policy-based electoral competition.

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    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

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  7. [해외논문]   Did foreign banks stay committed to emerging Europe during recent financial crises?   SSCI

    Bonin, John P. (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University, Middletown CT 06457 USA ) , Louie, Dana (Wesleyan University USA)
    Journal of comparative economics v.45 no.4 ,pp. 793 - 808 , 2017 , 0147-5967 ,

    초록

    Abstract Our objective is to investigate empirically the behavior of foreign banks with respect to real loan growth during periods of financial crisis for a set of countries in which foreign banks dominate the banking sectors due primarily to having taken over large existing former state-owned banks. The eight countries are among the most developed in emerging Europe, their banking sectors having been modernized by the middle of the last decade. We consider a data period that includes an initial credit boom (2005 – 2007) followed by the global financial crisis (2008 & 2009) and the onset of the Eurozone crisis (2010). Our two innovations with respect to the existing literature on banking during the financial crisis are to separate foreign banks into two categories, namely, subsidiaries of the Big 6 European multinational banks (MNBs) and all other foreign-controlled banks, and to take account of the impact of exchange rates during the period. Our results show that bank lending was impacted adversely by both crises but that the two types of foreign banks behaved differently. The Big 6 banks remained committed to the region in that their lending behavior was not different from that of domestic banks supporting the notion that these countries are treated as a “second home market” by these European MNBs. Contrariwise, the other foreign banks active in the region were involved in fueling the credit boom but then decreased their lending aggressively during the crisis periods. Our results also indicate that bank behavior in countries having flexible exchange rate regimes differs from that in those in (or effectively in) the Eurozone. Our results suggest that both innovations matter for studying bank behavior during crisis periods in the region and, by extension, to other small countries in which banking sectors are dominated by foreign financial institutions having different business models. Highlights Bank lending is pro-cyclical in eight new (non-Baltic) EU countries. Big-6 banks remained committed to this “second home market” during financial crises. Other foreign banks in the region reduced lending during these crisis periods. Controlling for exchange rate regimes has implications for Eurozone expansion.

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    무료다운로드 유료다운로드

    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

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  8. [해외논문]   Inter-industry relatedness and industrial-policy efficiency: Evidence from China's export processing zones   SSCI

    Chen, Zhao (China Centre for Economic Studies, Fudan University, China ) , Poncet, Sandra (Paris School of Economics (University of Paris 1) and CEPII, France ) , Xiong, Ruixiang (Corresponding author.)
    Journal of comparative economics v.45 no.4 ,pp. 809 - 826 , 2017 , 0147-5967 ,

    초록

    Abstract In this paper, we evaluate whether the efficiency of industrial policies depends on the consistency of their focus with the local productive structure. We use sector-level data from Chinese manufacturing surveys over the 1998–2007 period to show that the efficiency of the export-promoting policies implemented in export processing zones depends on whether they target activities for which the necessary capabilities and resources are available. We find export benefits from the EPZ policy which are greater for sectors with denser links with the local productive structure. Our results suggest that industrial-policy effectiveness is magnified by pre-existing productive knowledge. Highlights We evaluate the efficiency of the Chinese EPZ policy. We account for the consistency of their focus with the local productive structure. We find positive export repercussions from the EPZ policy. They are greater for sectors with denser links with the local productive structure. Industrial-policy effectiveness is magnified by pre-existing productive knowledge.

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    무료다운로드 유료다운로드

    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

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  9. [해외논문]   Does forced solidarity hamper investment in small and micro enterprises?   SSCI

    Grimm, Michael (Corresponding author. Fax: +498515093312. ) , Hartwig, Renate (University of Passau, Department of Economics, Innstrasse 29, 94032 Passau, Germany ) , Lay, Jann (GIGA, Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20354 Hamburg, Germany)
    Journal of comparative economics v.45 no.4 ,pp. 827 - 846 , 2017 , 0147-5967 ,

    초록

    Abstract Summary : Previous research has shown that small firms in poor countries achieve high marginal returns to capital but show low reinvestment rates. We investigate whether transfers motivated by risk sharing and forced redistribution can explain this pattern and may therefore hamper private sector development. The idea is that the more redistribution distorts the fairness of insurance, the more potentially successful entrepreneurs may be hindered to undertake profitable investments. The empirical results based on a sample of small firms operating in Burkina Faso support the main propositions of this paper. Highlights African growth is held back by very low investment rates in private business. Informal ‘taxes’ prevail to insure against high risks and to redistribute. Micro and small enterprises may not invest because of informal ‘taxation’. Entrepreneurs stay in sharing networks or step out and invest. Choice is explained by redistributive pressure, risk-aversion and investment returns.

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    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

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  10. [해외논문]   How close is Asia already to being a trade bloc?   SSCI

    Li, Chunding (Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China ) , Whalley, John (Department of Economics, Western University (UWO), Ontario, Canada)
    Journal of comparative economics v.45 no.4 ,pp. 847 - 864 , 2017 , 0147-5967 ,

    초록

    Abstract FTA bilateral and regional negotiations in Asia have developed quickly in the past decade moving Asia ever closer to an economic union. This paper uses a fifteen-country global general equilibrium model with trade costs to numerically calculate Debreu distance measures between the present situation and potential full Asia integration in the form of a trade bloc. Our results reveal that these large Asia economies can be close to full integration if they act timely in agreements through negotiation. All Asia countries will gain from Asia trade bloc arrangements except when the Asia FTA can only eliminate tariffs. These countries’ gain will increase as bilateral non-tariff elimination deepens. Larger countries will gain more than small countries. Asia FTA, Asia Union and RCEP will benefit member countries more than ASEAN+3. Global free trade will benefit all countries the most. Highlights This paper uses Debreu distance to measure the effects of Asia trade bloc. Most Asia countries will gain from Asia trade bloc arrangements. Larger countries gain more than small countries. Asia FTA, Asia Union and RCEP will largely benefit member countries.

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    무료다운로드 유료다운로드

    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

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