본문 바로가기
HOME> 저널/프로시딩 > 저널/프로시딩 검색상세

저널/프로시딩 상세정보

권호별목차 / 소장처보기

H : 소장처정보

T : 목차정보

Journal of public economics 13건

  1. [해외논문]   A simpler theory of optimal capital taxation  

    Saez, Emmanuel (Corresponding author.) , Stantcheva, Stefanie
    Journal of public economics v.162 ,pp. 120 - 142 , 2018 , 0047-2727 ,

    초록

    Abstract This paper develops a theory of optimal capital taxation that expresses optimal tax formulas in sufficient statistics. We first consider a simple model with utility functions linear in consumption and featuring heterogeneous utility for wealth. In this case, there are no transitional dynamics, the steady-state is reached immediately and has finite elasticities of capital with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This allows for a tractable optimal tax analysis with formulas expressed in terms of empirical elasticities and social preferences that can address many important policy questions. These formulas can easily be taken to the data to simulate optimal taxes, which we do using U.S. tax return data on labor and capital incomes. Second, we show how these results can be extended to the case with concave utility for consumption. The same types of formulas carry over by appropriately defining elasticities. We show that one can recover all the results from the simpler model using a new and non standard steady state approach that respects individual preferences even with a fully general utility function.

    원문보기

    원문보기
    무료다운로드 유료다운로드

    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

    이미지

    Fig. 1 이미지
  2. [해외논문]   Optimal management of transfers: An odd paradox  

    Bourguignon, Franç (Corresponding author.) , ois , Platteau, Jean-Philippe
    Journal of public economics v.162 ,pp. 143 - 157 , 2018 , 0047-2727 ,

    초록

    Abstract This paper considers the case of transfers when there exists a serious preference misalignment between the transfer-maker and the beneficiary. The former wants to reduce the resulting outcome discrepancy through monitoring the use of the transfer and imposing sanctions if the discrepancy proves too large. This external discipline combines with the ’internal discipline’ of the beneficiary, that is his/her willingness and ability to align with the transfer-maker's objective. Besides the fact that costs of monitoring and sanctioning are explicitly taken into account, an original feature of our model specification is that the two types of discipline are made comparable: they can be summed up to obtain an aggregate discipline. We show that, paradoxically, an (exogenous) improvement of internal discipline may be over-compensated by a fall of external discipline. Total discipline thus decreases and the discrepancy between the actual and the intended uses of the transfer increases instead of decreasing. Another consequence is that the relationship between internal and total disciplines may be non-monotonic. These results generalize to alternative specifications of the basic model.

    원문보기

    원문보기
    무료다운로드 유료다운로드

    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

    이미지

    Fig. 1 이미지
  3. [해외논문]   Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers  

    Besley, Timothy (Corresponding author.) , Malcomson, James M.
    Journal of public economics v.162 ,pp. 158 - 172 , 2018 , 0047-2727 ,

    초록

    Abstract With public services such as health and education, it is not straightforward for consumers to assess the quality of provision. Many such services are provided by monopoly not-for-profit providers and there is concern that for-profit providers may increase profit at the expense of quality. This paper explores the implications of entry by for-profit providers when there is unobserved quality. The model generates three key policy-relevant insights. First, by developing a novel approach to competition between different organizational forms, it frames the relevant trade-offs precisely. Second, it shows the value of keeping an incumbent not-for-profit as an active provider. Third, it characterizes the optimal payment (or voucher value) to an entrant for each consumer who switches in a way that can be applied empirically.

    원문보기

    원문보기
    무료다운로드 유료다운로드

    회원님의 원문열람 권한에 따라 열람이 불가능 할 수 있으며 권한이 없는 경우 해당 사이트의 정책에 따라 회원가입 및 유료구매가 필요할 수 있습니다.이동하는 사이트에서의 모든 정보이용은 NDSL과 무관합니다.

    NDSL에서는 해당 원문을 복사서비스하고 있습니다. 아래의 원문복사신청 또는 장바구니담기를 통하여 원문복사서비스 이용이 가능합니다.

    이미지

    Fig. 1 이미지

논문관련 이미지